Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

The State of Utah v. Dawn Marie Downs : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Linda M. Jones; Patrick Tan; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Mark Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Downs, No. 20070526 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/352

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CaseNo.20070526-CA

DAWN MARIE DOWNS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled
substance within a correctional facility, a second-degree-felony offense under Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(e) (Supp. 2005), entered in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Flonorable Timothy R. Hanson, presiding.

LINDA M. JONES (5497)
PATRICK TAN (9050)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

MARK SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DAWN MARIE DOWNS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20070526-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled
substance within a correctional facility, a second-degree-felony offense under Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(e) (Supp. 2005), entered in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, presiding.

LINDA M. JONES (5497)
PATRICK TAN (9050)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

MARK SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT

1

RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT

8

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE
AT TRIAL THAT WAS UNDULY PREJUDICIAL

8

A. THE UTAH RULES PROHIBIT THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF EVIDENCE THAT IS UNDULY PREJUDICIAL

8

B. EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE SEARCH WARRANT
AND DRUG ACTIVITY AT THE HOUSE SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AT TRIAL

12

C. DOWNS WAS PREJUDICED BY THE INADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE

18

CONCLUSION

20

Addendum A: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment
Addendum B: Utah R. Evid. 403
Addendum C: Excerpts from Trial Transcript
i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1980)
Diversified Holdings. L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, 63 P.3d 686

9
9, 18

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

3

StateinreR.D.S, Ill P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1990)

9

State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, 108P.3d730,
cert, denied, 546 U.S. 832 (2005)

10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17

State v. Atkin, 2003 UT App 359, 80 P.3d 157,
cert, denied, 90 P.3d 1040 (Utah 2004)

11

State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

9, 10

State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

20

State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 837)

11

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

9, 10

State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, 52 P.3d 1194,
cert, denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003)

10

State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, 61 P.3d 291

10

State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, 61 P.3d 1019

9

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988)
State v. Lenaburz, 781 P.2d 432 (Utah 1989),
abrogated on other grounds as stated in
State v. Deporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997)
State v. Lindzren, 910 P.2d 1268 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)

9

State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, 44 P.3d 805

19
17, 18
1

ii

Page
State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989)

9

State v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989)

18

State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59. 6 P.3d 1120

11

State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)

10

State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986)

9, 20

State v. Rees, 2004 UT App 51, 88 P.3d 359

10

State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)

18

State v. Shickles, 760P.2d291 (Utah 1988)

10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987)

19, 20

State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995)

18

U.S. v. Thomas, 632 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1980),
cert, denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980)

11

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (Supp. 2005)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2002)

1
Rules

Utah R. App. P. 29

20

Utah R. Evid. 403

2,8,9,11, 13, 18

UtahR. ofEvid.404

8, 10, 11, 12

in

i \ i"HE UTAH ('OUR i' OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

;> \ '.•. \ \i.\i< !!.;;.>,• ••• ••

:

Case No. 20070526-CA

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

- ; .*..."•';><,,, ,.,v!!--{

(2002). Appellant Dawn Downs w^'/- ?; -rvJ •,• *(j ^ -.:.-.-*» •••/'•

a conh'olled substance within a correenonal facility. a second-dcgrcc-fclouy offense
under : iaii •. uac .\n;i. s :.N-. ;; / :-.i..:); o;« iMipp. iOitj). "fhe judgment is attached hereto as
Addendum A. K:;c *•

MOV).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue: WheUiCr the trial ciarri ,.s\\:d m ^diiuiuh^ c\ u-jnoc ihat was unduly
nn:iu'Vf.-i'.u. /ori.'.! fn<.

r i . l - '• - e : > - ^ . n * -

* •' - ' i ' . •:"'\ !••-1-'• •

'• *

!

^r.^

f

- u ,

Standard of Review: "The question of whether evidence is admissible can be
either a question of" discretion, which we review for abuse of discretion, or a question of
lav* M. hf;h '•. 4 ' " : ^ !' ' > '

•'.'. ••'•-; '" '*tate v. Merlin.

N"

l

:

-. * '

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
The issue was preserved ID the lueord on appeal at 134:13-23.
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RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provision is relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at
Addendum B: Utah R. Evid. 403 (2007).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below
On January 5, 2006, the state filed an information against Downs - that it later
amended - charging unlawful possession of a controlled substance in a correctional
facility, a second-degree-felony offense. (R. 2-3; 103-04). On June 8, 2006, the trial
court conducted a preliminary hearing and bound the case over for trial. (R. 32-33). On
March 28 and 29, 2007, the trial court conducted a jury trial in the matter, and at the
conclusion of trial, the jury found Downs guilty as charged. (R. 156). On June 4, 2007,
the trial court sentenced Downs to a suspended prison term and ordered her to serve 90
days in jail followed by probation. (R. 170-72). On June 22, 2007, Downs filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R. 173). She is not incarcerated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The state presented the following evidence at trial. On November 30, 2005, at
approximately 10:30 or 11:00 at night, police executed a search warrant on a home at
2965 South 700 East, in Salt Lake City. (R. 184:113-15, 116). According to the
evidence, Dawn Downs and Brian Stevens lived at the address. (See R. 184:121).
The warrant focused on Stevens. (R. 184:141). Officers were "going after a drug
distribution operation that was going on in that house" conducted by Stevens. (R. 184:
143 (stating that a confidential informant had dealings with Stevens)). Officers were not
2

aware at the time that Downs lived at the home. (R. 184:141-42, 145). She was not
listed as a person of interest in the warrant. (See, e.g., R 184:142-43").
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(R. 184:167). He discovered two outstanding warrants for misdemeanor offenses, so he
took Downs into custody and transported her to the jail. (R. 184:167-68 (stating he also
transported Stevens and Kelly Stetcher); see also R. 184:175).
Eatchel testified that it is his practice to ask arrestees at the jail "if they have
anything [in their possession] that I need to know about, anything that can't go into the
jail because if they take anything into the jail, it's an additional charge." (R. 184:168-69).
According to Eatchel, he warned Downs about taking contraband into the jail. She did
not indicate that she had anything illegal. (R. 184:169). Eatchel then took Downs into
the booking area and turned her over to the jail staff. (R. 184:169).
Christine Pugh worked in the processing area of the jail. (R. 184:155). It was her
job to search new arrivals, and to book or process them by obtaining fingerprints and
taking pictures. (R. 184:155, 159-60). Pugh processed Downs. (R. 184:156). She asked
if Downs had any illegal items including weapons or contraband. (R. 184:156-57, 160).
Downs responded that she did not. (R. 184:157). Downs remained handcuffed while
Pugh performed an intake search by checking Downs's waistband and pockets. (R.
184:157). Pugh discovered a baggie in the right coin pocket of Downs's pants. It
contained a white crystalline substance. (R. 184:157-58, 170; Exhibit 15 (identifying the
item as "8"); see also R. 184:128, 137, 178). Pugh could not recall that the baggie was
any particular color. (R. 184:161). Downs indicated to Pugh that the baggie was not
hers: "she didn't know where [it] came from." (R. 184:162).
Pugh turned the baggie over to Detective Eatchel and he took it back to the house
for processing. (R. 184:128, 158, 170; Exhibit 15). Eatchel did not note anything parti4

cular about the item, and he did not note its size. (R. 184:179). He identified it at trial as
90 grams of methamphetamine in a plastic bag labeled as Exhibit 18. (R. 184:173).
Downs indicated to Eatchel that the substance did not belong to her. (R. 184:180).
State criminalist Kevin Smith tested the substance in the baggie from the jail
(Exhibit 18 on Exhibit List), and substances from the house. (Exhibits 19 through 24 on
Exhibit List). According to Smith, the substances tested positive for methamphetamine.
(R. 184:190-91 (identifying Exhibit 18 as item number 144567)). Smith testified that the
items identified as Exhibits 18, 19, 20, and 23 were labeled as "pink." (R. 184:191).
Also, plastic baggies for Exhibits 18 and 19 appeared to be similar, although the baggie
for Exhibit 18 was smaller. (R. 184:193, 197). He stated that the baggies for Exhibits 18
and 19 would not have come from the same commercial box. (R. 184:197).
Smith described the methamphetamine in both Exhibits 18 and 19 as "off-white
solids." (R. 184:197). Also, he maintained that the controlled substances "absolutely"
could have come from the same source. (R. 184:198).
Both the state and the defense presented evidence concerning Downs's activities
on November 30. State witness Karen Larabee testified that on November 30, she went
for a late lunch with Downs and two other women to celebrate their birthdays. (R.
184:204 (identifying the other women as Tracy and Misty)). It was approximately 3:00
when Karen arrived at Downs's house. (R. 184:205-06). She drove. (Id.) Downs was
not ready, so the women drove to Thrift Town at 3300 South 1300 East. (R. 184:208-09).
Karen purchased shirts and pants. (R. 184:210). She also had several pairs of pants in
her car. (R. 184:211). Some of the items were for her daughter. (Id.)
5

After shopping, the women returned to Downs's house (R. 184:212), then they all
drove to Chuck-A-Rama on 6400 South and State Street. (R. 184:212-13). It was
approximately 4:30. (R. 184:213). As the women pulled into the parking lot, Downs
began coughing hard (R. 184:214-15, 228), causing "an accident in her pants." (R.
184:215). Downs wanted to go home to change her clothes; however, Karen insisted she
put on a pair of pants that she had purchased at Thrift Town. (R. 184:215, 228). They
found a pair that fit (R. 184:216, 230), and the women continued with their birthday
celebration as planned. (See R. 184:219). Karen testified that after eating, she drove the
women home and she arrived back at her house at 7:00 that evening. (R. 184:219-20).
Downs did not return the pants that she borrowed that evening. (R. 184:232).
Karen testified that she used to work at Thrift Town. (R. 184:209). Thrift Town
is a thrift shop; her duties as an employee included sorting through clothing and checking
for spots, tossing rejected items, and placing items for resale on hangers. (R. 184:218).
Karen testified that when clothes came to Thrift Town for resale, employees would not
necessarily go through the pockets. (R. 184:218-19). "We didn't have time to do that."
Items moved by quickly on a conveyor belt. (R. 184:219; see also 184:230-31 (some
items were washed; some items were not)).
Karen testified that when she went through the pockets of clothing at Thrift Town,
she found "a rubber," tissue, and "$10 once." (R. 184:219). Karen's daughter also "found
a rubber in one of her pair of pants. I've been shopping there and I always find stuff in
the pants pockets." (R. 184:219).
The defense called Misty Clarke to testify to the events of November 30. She
6

stated that she spent the morning with Downs helping her clean. (R. 185:250). The
women then planned to meet others for a late birthday lunch. (R. 185:250-51). When the
others arrived, Downs was not ready, so Misty went shopping with the women at Thrift
Town. (R. 185:251, 262-63). Misty testified that Karen bought pants, then the women
returned to pickup Downs and continued on to Chuck-A-Rama where Downs "ended up
having a cough attack in the car and she peed her pants." (R. 185:251-52). Karen offered
Downs a pair of pants, and after dinner, Karen drove them back to Downs's house, and
Misty left. (R. 185:252-53; see also 185:262-71 (reiterating what happened during the
day; and stating "I honestly couldn't tell you the exact times")).
Based on the evidence presented at trial, Downs maintained that the drugs found in
the pants pocket at the jail did not belong to her. (See R. 184:162, 180). She wore pants
that evening that Karen bought at Thrift Town. (R. 184:215, 228-30). Employees at
Thrift Town did not search clothes before they placed them on the rack for resale. (R.
184:218-19). Downs changed into the pants after "a cough attack" that caused her to soil
her own clothes. (R. 185:251-52). She was wearing the Thrift Town pants when she was
arrested later that night on outstanding misdemeanor warrants. (See R. 184:232). She
did not know that methamphetamine was in the pocket. (See R. 184:162). When she
arrived at the jail for processing, an officer discovered the baggie of drugs. (R. 184:157).
Notwithstanding the evidence, the jury convicted Downs of possession of a
controlled substance in a correctional facility. (R. 185:346). Downs has raised an
evidentiary issue on appeal.

7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Downs was charged with possession of a controlled substance in a correctional
facility. She was taken to the correctional facility after officers discovered that she had
misdemeanor warrants outstanding for her arrest. At trial, over defense counsel's
objections, the state presented evidence relating to execution of a search warrant at the
house where Downs lived. The state also presented evidence that officers had conducted
surveillance on the house for drug trafficking, and they found evidence of drugs at the
house. Since Downs was charged with possession at a correctional facility, she maintains
that evidence presented at trial relating to the search warrant and drug activity at the
house was unduly prejudicial. For that reason, Downs respectfully requests that this
Court reverse and remand this case for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
THAT WAS UNDULY PREJUDICIAL,
A court may exclude unduly prejudicial evidence from admission at trial. Downs
maintains that evidence presented at trial relating to the search warrant and drug activity
at the house was unduly prejudicial, confusing, and in violation of Rule 403. The trial
court should have excluded the evidence here.
A. THE UTAH RULES PROHIBIT THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
THAT IS UNDULY PREJUDICIAL.
The analysis in this case begins with Rules 403 and 404, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 403 states the following:

8

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403 (2007). The question of whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is
"generally entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be upset on
appeal absent manifest error." State inre R.D.S.* 111 P.2d 532, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(quoting State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah 1989)), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1990); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993) (stating an appellate court
will determine whether admitting the evidence was "beyond the limits of reasonability")
(cite omitted).
Under the law, evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it confuses the jury, '"appeals to
the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish,' or
otherwise 'may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established
propositions in the case.'" State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(quoting Carter v. Hewitt 611 F.2d 961, 972-73 (3d Cir. 1980)); Diversified Holdings,
L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, ^f 38, 63 P.3d 686 (where evidence may have led to
confusion, it was properly excluded); see also State v. KelU 2002 UT 106, \ 30, 61 P.3d
1019 (citing State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988)); State v. Rammel 721
P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986) (excluding impeachment testimony where potential for prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value under the rule that preceded mle 403).
In addition, "[w]hen applying rule 403, it is necessary to determine first whether
the proffered evidence has an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or
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mislead the jury." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1221. To that end, a court will balance the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect to ensure that matters of
"scant or cumulative probative force" are not "dragged in by the heels for the sake of
[their] prejudicial effect." Bartley, 784 P.2d at 1237 (quotation and cite omitted).
In a criminal case, a court will apply a multi-factor balancing test to determine
whether evidence - of prior bad acts or uncharged conduct - should be excluded at trial
due to its prejudicial effect. Specifically, the court will consider [1] the strength of the
evidence of uncharged conduct; [2] the similarities between the uncharged conduct and
the conduct charged in the instant case; [3] the interval of time that has elapsed between
the charged and uncharged conduct; [4] "the need for the evidence, [5] the efficacy of
alternative proof, and [6] the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to
overmastering hostility." State v. Allen* 2005 UT 11, ^ 24, 108 P.3d 730 (referring to
"these factors as the 'Shickles factors1"; and citing, inter alia, State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d
291, 295-96 (Utah 1988)), cert, denied, 546 U.S. 832 (2005); State v. Fedorowicz, 2002
UT 67, U 36, 52 P.3d 1194, cert, denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003); State v. Rees, 2004 UT
App 51, U 5, 88 P.3d 359; State v. HolberU 2002 UT App 426, \ 32, 61 P.3d 291; State v.
Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 370 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
That analysis is relevant to this case: Downs maintains evidence presented at trial
relating to the search warrant and drug activity at the house was unduly prejudicial.
In addition, Rule 404(b) is relevant here. According to that rule,
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
10

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided
that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (2007).
The rule against improper use of character evidence works to ensure that a
defendant is convicted because he committed the charged offense, and not because the
jury is convinced that he is of bad character. See_ State v. Atkin, 2003 UT App 359, *|] 31,
80 P.3d 157, cert, denied. 90 P.3d 1040 (Utah 2004); U.S. v. Thomas. 632 F.2d 837, 845
(10th Cir. 1980) (evidence that defendant committed similar acts is not admissible to
prove defendant's guilt for the charged offense), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980).
Utah courts have ruled that for admissibility under Rule 404(b), the court must
examine the evidence to determine whether (1) it "is offered for a proper, noncharacter
purpose, such as one of those listed in rule 404(b); (2) the evidence meets the
requirements of rule 402; and (3) the evidence meets the requirements of rule 403."
Allen, 2005 UT 11, f 16 (citing State v. Nelson-Wazzoner. 2000 UT 59,ffi[18-20, 6 P.3d
1120; State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ff 21-22, 29, 993 P.2d 837).
Under the three-part test for Rule 404(b), Downs maintains that evidence relating to the search warrant and drug activity at the house - was inadmissible under the
third prong. The evidence failed to meet the requirements of Rule 403.
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B. EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE SEARCH WARRANT AND DRUG
ACTIVITY AT THE HOUSE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AT
TRIAL.
In this case, the state charged Downs with possession of a controlled substance in
a correctional facility. (R. 2-3; 103-04). According to the state's evidence, while Officer
Pugh was booking Downs into the county jail on outstanding warrants, she discovered a
baggie of controlled substance in Downs's pants pocket. (R. 184:157-58,170). Downs
maintained that the drugs did not belong to her. (R. 184:162).
Based on the charge at issue, the defense requested that the prosecutor be excluded
from presenting evidence that officers executed a search warrant at Downs's home and
discovered drug activity there. Defense counsel maintained that such evidence would be
irrelevant to the charge for possession in a correctional facility and it would be unduly
prejudicial and confusing. (R. 184:13-17).
The trial court disagreed. It allowed the evidence under Rule 404(b) where it
"goes directly to Ms. Downs' knowledge and intent; therefore, it is absolutely relevant."
(R. 184:18; see also id. at 184:18-19 (stating the evidence "goes to" lack of mistake)).
The court also ruled that the evidence would not be unduly prejudicial or confusing, but
rather, it would give "context to the jury." (R. 184:18-19). Those portions of the
transcript reflecting the objection and ruling are attached hereto as Addendum C.
As a result of the ruling, the prosecutor called several witnesses to present
evidence relating to drug activity at the residence. Officer Shumway testified to an
investigation leading up to the search warrant, execution of the search warrant, and items
found in the house. She testified that prior to obtaining a search warrant for the
12

residence, she was able to purchase drugs on two occasions at the home with a
confidential informant. (R. 184:115). Also, on about November 30, 2006, she was
involved in executing a search warrant at Brian Stevens's home at 2965 South 700 East.
(R. 184:115). Shumway identified several diagrams, and photographs relating to the
residence and photographs of individuals inside the house when the warrant was
executed. (R. 184:117-22). She identified documents with Stevens's and Downs's names
on them. (R. 184:121,124).
She described items found in the home including "a large tin box" filled with
"multiple small plastic bags commonly used to distribute drugs" and a container of
magnets used to store drugs and to hide them. (R. 184:121). She described a small black
box with baggies, packages with methamphetamine, and large amounts of cash. (R.
184:125-27). And she testified that officers found individuals in the home, including
Downs, and they processed those individuals for warrants. (R. 184:129-30).
Also, Officer Eatchel testified that while processing individuals at the home, he
discovered warrants outstanding for Downs and he later transported her and other
individuals from the home to the jail. (See R. 184:131, 166-67). In addition, criminalist
Kevin Smith testified that he conducted tests on substances found at the house and he
determined that the substances were methamphetamine. (R. 184:190-91).
In this case, the prosecutor relied extensively on events at the residence in
presenting his case to the jury. (See R. 185:313-17). The evidence of events at the home
was excessive. It should have been excluded under Rule 403 and the Shickles factors.
(See supra, page 10, herein, identifying the six Shickles factors); Allen, 2005 UT 11, ^ 24.
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Specifically, the first Shickles factor concerns "the strength of the evidence as to
the commission of the other crime." Allen, 2005 UT 11, ^f 24. In this case, the evidence
concerning "the commission of the other crime" is the evidence relating to drug activity
at the home. The strength of that evidence as it relates to Downs is weak. Indeed,
Downs was not the focus of the search warrant or even a person of interest (R. 184:14042, 144); the state did not produce evidence that Downs committed a crime at the home.
Downs was not cited for or even mentioned in connection with drug activity at the
residence. (See, e.g.. R. 184:140-42, 144).
The charge against Downs in this case related exclusively to drugs found in the
jail. (See, e.g., 184:148 (stating that the drugs at issue in this case came from the jail)).
In addition, officers transported Downs to the jail because of unrelated, outstanding
misdemeanor warrants. (R. 184:167-68). Evidence that Downs committed a crime at the
residence or engaged in criminal activity there was non-existent. (See R. 184:140-42,
144; see also 184:139 (acknowledging that nothing connected Downs to the large
amounts of money found at the house)). Based on the first factor, the trial court erred in
allowing the state to present evidence at trial relating to the search warrant and drug
activity at the home.
The second Shickles factor concerns the similarities and circumstances surrounding the events. See Allen, 2005 UT 11, \ 24 (stating the second factor considers "the
similarities between the crimes"). In this case, the circumstances at the house had no real
bearing on or similarities to the charge for possession at the correctional facility.

Downs

was not charged as a result of conduct at the residence (R. 184:140-42, 144); she was

14

charged for conduct at the jail. (R. 184:147-48 (stating drugs came from the jail)).
In addition, the state's own evidence fails to support an actual link between
circumstances at the residence and circumstances at the jail. Specifically, the state
intended to use evidence relating to activities at the residence to tie the methamphelamine
there to the methamphetamine found at the jail. (R. 184:14-15; see also R. 184:191 -92
(comparing baggies found at the house to the baggie found in the jail)). Yet according to
the state's evidence, items found in the home were "commonly used" for distributing
drugs. (R. 184:121, 125-26, 140). There was nothing particularly unique about the
items. In addition, there was nothing unique about the plastic baggie found at the jail in
this case. (See id.\ see also R. 184:161 (Pugh did not recall any particular characteristic
about the baggie found at the jail); 184:179 (Eatchel did not note any particular
characteristic about the baggie found at the jail)). Any link between items at the house
and the baggie at the jail was speculative at best.
Furthermore, the criminalist who tested substances here stated that the plastic
baggie found in the jail was not similar in size to plastic baggies found at the house. (See
R. 184:197-98 (stating that although he is not an expert on pulling baggies from a box,
the baggie found at the jail is smaller and he would not expect it to come from the same
commercial box as the other baggies); see also R. 184:190-91, 196 (identifying
differences between the amounts of substances found in the different baggies)). The only
similarity in the baggies was color. (See R. 184:137 (indicating pink baggie found at the
jail); 184:190-92 (comparing color of items found at the house and item found at the
jail)). That similarity may be attributed to coincidence as much as anything else.
15

Also, there is no indication that state agents conducted any test to determine if the
particular substance found at the jail was actually identical in terms of chemical composition to substances found at the house. (R. 184:197, 198). The criminalist testified
that general appearances were similar and the substances could have come from the same
source. (R. 184:196-97, 198). Without more, the circumstances at the house are not
sufficiently similar to the circumstances at the jail to support probative value under Rule
403. Based on the second factor, the trial court erred in allowing the state to present
evidence at trial relating to the search warrant and drug activity at the home.
The third Shickles factor is a timing element. See Allen, 2005 UT 11, % 24. It
considers whether sufficient time has elapsed - between the act of uncharged conduct and
the act of conduct charged in the case at hand - to weaken any link between the two acts.
In this case, other intervening circumstances weaken the link between the conduct
at the house and events at the jail. The intervening circumstances included the following:
Officers were involved in events at the house focusing on Brian Stevens. (R. 184:143).
The events there had no bearing on Downs; she was not a person of interest. (R. 184:14142, 145). Officers arrested Downs at the house for unrelated outstanding warrants. (See
R. 184:167-68, 175). Eatchel then transported Downs to the jail where another officer,
Pugh, discovered controlled substances. (R. 184:157-58, 170). Downs was charged with
possession of a controlled substance in the jail. (R. 184:148 (recognizing drugs were
found in the jail)). That is separate from events at the house. The facts support
intervening circumstances. Based on the third factor, the trial court erred in allowing the
state to present evidence relating to the search warrant and drugs at the home.
16

The fourth and fifth Shickles factors are related. They consider the need for the
evidence and the efficacy of alternative proof. See Allen, 2005 UT 11,ffi[24, 32
(identifying the fourth and fifth Shickles factors; ruling that the state "needed" the
evidence in Allen's case to show conspiracy and it would have been "difficult" to
establish conspiracy through alternative proof). Here, the state did not need evidence
relating to events at the house. Specifically, the facts here show that Pugh discovered
controlled substances in Downs's pocket after Downs arrived at the jail. (R. 184:157-58,
170). The state then pursued a charge against Downs for possession in a correctional
facility. (R. 2-3; 103-04). Since the charge concerned a controlled substance at the jail,
the evidence relating to events at the house was unnecessary.
Indeed, that evidence concerned a drug investigation against Brian Stevens,
execution of a search warrant, and the discovery of controlled substances and items at the
house. In this case, Downs was not cited for or even mentioned in connection with
controlled substance activities at the residence. (See R. 184:141-43). Her charge related
only to possession at the jail. (R. 184:148; 103-04). Based on the fourth and fifth
factors, the trial court erred in allowing the state to present evidence at trial relating to the
search warrant and drug activity at the house.
Finally, under the sixth Shickles factor, the evidence of events at the house served
to confuse the jury, and it incited overmastering hostility in the jury. Evidence that
Downs lived at a drug house was intended to unfairly appeal to jurors' sympathies, to
arouse their sense of horror, to provoke their instinct to punish, and to create confusion to
Downs's detriment. See infra, page 19, herein; State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1272
17

(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that if evidence confuses the jury, appeals to it
sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, or provokes its instinct to punish, it may be
unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible); Diversified Holdings. L.C.* 2002 UT 129, If 38
(stating that evidence leading to confusion or speculation about what might have
happened was properly excluded); State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 1191 (Utah 1995)
(requiring a showing of "unusual probative value" if evidence has an unusually strong
propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame or mislead a jury). The evidence was unduly
prejudicial and confusing.
Based on the Shickles factors, the trial court erred in allowing the state to present
evidence at trial relating to the search warrant and drug activity at the house. The
evidence was inadmissible under Rule 403.
C. DOWNS WAS PREJUDICED BY THE INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated the prejudice standard for evidentiary
error as follows: "If, in the absence of the evidentiary errors, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for defendant, we must reverse the conviction."
State v. RimmascK 175 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989); State v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116,
1122 (Utah 1989) (in assessing harm, the court will not apply the sufficiency-of-theevidence standard; "rather, it focuses on the taint caused by the error").
"In analyzing errors, we are guided by the fundamental principle that all the rules
relating to the conduct of criminal trials are meant to provide a fair, reasonable and
practical means of doing justice. Where the error is one in which the fundamental
fairness of the procedure by which the result is reached is drawn into question so as to
18

cast doubt on the result, then reversal is warranted." State v. Lenaburg% 781 P.2d 432,
436-37 (Utah 1989) (internal cites omitted), abrogated on other grounds as stated in
State v. Deporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997).
In this case, the evidence concerning the search warrant and drugs at the house
was misleading and confusing. Officers did not consider Downs to be part of the drug
operations at the residence; and they did not charge or cite her for activities at the
residence. (See R. 184:144). Nevertheless, evidence of drugs at the house would have
provoked the jury to penalize Downs simply for being there. Indeed, the jury in this case
likely convicted Downs without event considering her defense.
Yet Downs presented a credible defense. She maintained that the drugs found at
the jail were not hers. (R. 184:162, 180). They were already in the pants when she
borrowed them from Karen that evening. Karen had just purchased the pants from Thrift
Town. (R. 184:210, 215, 228-30). Employees at Thrift Town did not search clothing for
items left in pockets. (R. 184:218-19). Thus, the drugs here were in the pants pocket
when Karen purchased them, and they were still in the pocket when Downs wore the
pants after she had an accident in her own clothes. (See R. 184:215-16, 228, 230
(reflecting that Downs borrowed the pants)). The evidence reflected a credible defense.
However, because the evidentiary error here was substantial and prejudicial, the jury
likely disregarded it.
That should undermine this Court's confidence in the verdict. Absent the error,
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have given credence to Downs's
defense and it would have reached Ma more favorable result." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d
19

546, 555 (Utah 1987). The jury likely would have acquitted Downs of the possession
charge. This Court may reverse the conviction in this case due to the evidentiary error.
See State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (stating that the jury may have
reached a different result in the absence of the highly prejudicial evidence); State v.
Rammej 721 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986) (stating impeachment evidence should have
been excluded as prejudicial).
CONCLUSION
The issue in this case may be readily resolved based on the record and established
Utah law. See Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Downs respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the conviction for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

3rd

day of Vecewber

2007.

Linida M. Jones
Patrick Tan
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

20

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Linda M. Jones, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered an
original and 7 copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State
Street, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and 4 copies to the Attorney General's
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, this 3rrl day of _ J l f C £ i » L ] i £ r

, 2007.

LINDA M. JONES (]
DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah Court of
Appeals as indicated above this

day of ~X)^-Ce\%\)Cr •, 2007.

21

Tab A

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
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Clerk:
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Prosecutor: SHEFFIELD, KELLY R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): TAN, PATRICK S
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 11, 1969
Video
Tape Count: 91944
CHARGES
1. POSS C/S WITH IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY (amended) - 2nd Degree
Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/29/2007 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS C/S WITH IN
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 061900114
Date:
Jun 04, 2007

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS C/S WITH IN
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 90 day(s) in the Salt Lake County Jail
Commitment is to begin immediately.

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$10000.00
$9250.00
$662.50
$1412.50
$10000.00
$9250.00
$662.50
$1412.50
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 6 month (s) .
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 90 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1412.50 where the surcharge has been
added to the fine. Interest may increase the final amount due.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
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Case No: 061900114
Date:
Jun 04, 2007
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Violate no laws.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages
COMPLY WITH ALL A/D CLAUSES PER AP&P, COMPLETE SUBSTANCE ABUSE
EVALUATION/TREATMENT AS RECOMMENDED BY A^4p, MAINTAIN FULLTIME
EMPLOYMENT, NO CONTACT WITH CO-DEFT UNLESS APPRQSiED-JBY AP&P
Dated this

day of

Ai)U
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Utah R. Evid- 403
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of
time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for exclusion of
relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of substance, since "surprise" would
be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403. See also Advisory
Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances
would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle,
445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case
ruled prejudicial and violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same
effect. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns,
615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).
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for the attorneys ro do it then they will.

For the bulk of the

voir dire the Court conducts the questioning.

3
4

5

Is there anything else that, we need ro address before we
bring up the jury?
MR. TAN:

Yes, your Honor.

There is one pre-trial issue

6

that we wanted the Court to make a ruling on before we proceed

7

with rhe trial.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. TAN:

All right.

Okay.

In regards to this case Ms. Downs was picked

10

up at the location and transported to rhe jail because she had

11

some outstanding justice court warrants.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. TA.N:

Okay.
I believe they were they non-drug related.

I

14

believe that was established at the preliminary hearing.

15

actually think they were just traffic warrants.

16

arrested at the scene for any of the drugs or drug paraphernalia

17

at the house, but when she v/as booked into jail that's when the

18

officer found that she had a baggie of alleged controlled

19

substance in it and she was arrested because of that and charged

20

with the sole count of possession of a controlled substance at a

21

correctional facility.

I

So she wasn't

22

My understanding, talking to Mr. Blaylock this morning,

23

is that the State is planning on introducing the bench war -- or

24

the search warrant that was executed at the location and also

25

bring in a lot of information that I don/t believe would be

-14-

1

relevant to 'the case.

2

address the Court on that.

Once aga in, Ms. Fulkerson
She 's done some

wou Id .iike to

research on the law

and also the facts of this case , and she wanted to j ust address
trie Court on that issue.

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

What ar e y our

concerns, Ms . Fulkerson?
MS . FULKERSON:
jus1; a basic 401

9

Thank you again, your Honor .

(inaudible) 3 argument, your Honor.

that this is clearly

irrelevant to her arrest.

This is
:

think

I th ink that it

10

'would also u nduly prejudice and confuse the jury in this case.

11

Whe re we have a drug case, a possession of controlled

12

substance and we have the searc h warrant relating tc wh at it

13

related to, but where she was not actually

14

with that wa rrant I think clear ly would be prejudicial in this

15

case and I would ask that it be excluded on those grounds.

16

THE COURT:

All right.

arrested in connection

Was Ms. Downs listed on the

17

search warrant as a party that would be present at the place

18

being searched.

19
20
21
22
23

Do --

MR. BLAYLOCK:

She was not specifically

listed; however,

the search warrant says, "and search all persons present."
THE COURT:

Persons there.

All right.

Thank you.

Response, Mr. Blaylock?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Your Honor, there are a number of facts

24

that were determined at the scene that relate to her knowledge,

25

lack of mistake and things of that nature.

One of those

-151

particular is that the controlled substances that were found were

2

found packaged in a manner similar to the one in her pocket, the

3

same color as the one found in her pocket.

4

So I would suggest that it's important tha t we be

5

allowed to show, because intent is a critical issue here that

6

there was no mistake and there was knowledge on her part.

In

7 i fact, also that she lived at this location, that sh e was
familiar with the other defendant who was charged \ ith the

9

other controlled substances that were found at the scene.

10

There's a bill that comes to that address showing that

11

in fact she does live there.

12

of the officers she had no idea what was going on.

13

it would be important to show what was observed at the scene so

14

the jury can make a decision of v/hether or not she should have

15

known or could -- did know what was going on as opposed to merely

16

claiming, "I knew nothing."

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. TAN:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. TAN:

As a matter of fact, she told one

Thank you.

Well, I think

Further response?

And your Honor, if I may respond.
You may.
Having done the prelim, I can address the

21

issue.

22

with just one count, and the count is very specific.

23

has amended it in regards to the location.

24

residence, but it is the jail.

First of all, as the Information states, she is charged
The State

It's not the

The original Information yes, she was charged with being

-16m

po ssession at the location of 2965 South 7 00 East, which

was t he address on the search warrant.

However, the Sta te has

amend ed this, and they're specifically pointina out to the Court,
and s ubsequently to the jury, that she was i"ound trying to
smugg ie drugs into the jail.

It has nothing to do with what took

place at the 7th East 29th South location.
Furthermore, it is just one count.
else.

9

There is nc thing

She is not charged with possession oi: drug pa rapt-rnalia.

She is not charged with any of the controlled substances that

10

were found at the location.

11

relevant to her as well, if in fact there are relevant i ssues of

12

her b e±ng at the location, why did the detectives ana tl xe SWAT

13

team and whoever else that entered the home and did the raid,

14

they cited a lot of other people.

15

If in fact the search warrant is

There were obviously one co-defendant we know of; I

16

believe there might be more.

17

or even mentioned to have any type of connection with any of

18

the controlled substances within the residential area.

19

charged with possession of a controlled substance at the jail.

20

However, Ms. Downs was not cited

She is

I believe that if the State was to allow or to be

21

allowed to admit into evidence a search warrant and also any

22

background information, then, that the State's witnesses will

23

test_fy to, I think that's going to just confuse the jury.

24

They're going to try to then link Ms. Downs, who was charged with

25

possession of a controlled substance at the nail, with the fact

•17-

1

that there were other people charged at tne residential area

2

instead.

3

So I think, once again, it is highly prejudicial.

I

4

don't see any probative value involved.

I think it also will

5

comu^e the jury because they're going to think that she is

6

charged with possession, and it is irrelevant if it's at the jail

7

or at the residential area.

8

would ask the Court not to allow the State to amend it r o a

9

second

If that's the eas^, once again we

degree of possession at a correctional facility, because

10

the jury is going to think, "Well, she's in possession.

11

she had the drugs back at the residential place instead of the

12

jail," then the Information is not correct.

13

argument on that, your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

15

All right.

Thank you.

Maybe

So we would make an

If you wish to

respond.

16

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Just one other comment.

My understanding

17

from the individuals that the defense has called as witnesses is

18

she has a very specific defense, and that is, "Those weren't my

19

pants."

20

tie in the drugs that were found in the pants with the drugs that

21

were found at the residence and with what was there to see at the

22

residence and to know.

23
24

So I think it's critical that the State be allowed to

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

I to the

25 |

MR. TAN:

Nothing else, your Honor

Any further response

-18THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

Trie -- again, the

issues are very appropriately addressed at this point, but I
do find that the evidence of how the defendant possessed the
methainphetamme, that the burden on the State is to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt her knowledge and intent into possessing the
methamphetamine, and that is the first part of the charge.

It is

an element that the State must prove, and that this evidence goes
directly to Ms. Downs' knowledge and intent; therefore, it JS

9

absolutely relevant.

10

Whether or not it is so prejudicial that that

11

outweighs the relevance and would be unfair and unjust to allow

12

that evidence in, I do not find that that is tne case.

13

that this gives context to the jury.

14

them, that it actually gives them context, but that in order to

15

prove any possession of a controlled substance the State has got

16

to prove that Ms. Downs possessed the methamphetamine.

17

I think

It is not confusing to

Whether or not that is shown at the jail or at another

38

place is not more prejudicial to Ms. Downs.

19

prejudicial to Ms. Downs that she possessed it somewhere else.

20

The same evidence of her possession is going to be coming in,

21

and so the fact that it comes in in the context that it was at

22

a search warrant at a residence where she was, and

23

there's some evidence that she resides there, goes directly to

24

her knowledge and lack of mistake.

25

the case -- the State's ability to enter this in its case in

It is not more

apparently

So that goes specifically to

1

2

Clearly if it is also the defense, and Ms. Downs has

3

no responsibility to even provide any defense, but clearly if
it does go to the defense, then -- then that information is
appropriate there.

But the first part of the ruling has got to

6

be whether or not the State can even use it in their case in

7

chief.

8

element that they must prove this knowing possession, and that

9

it -- the fact that the possession may have occurred somewhere

I find that this is absolutely relevant to the State's

10

besides the address and the correctional facility does

11

it irrelevant to the case.

12

not make

The know -- anything that makes the possession more .

13

knowing, more intentional, more likely than not is by definition

14

relevant, and the prejudice just simply is not extensive at all.

15

The only prejudice that goes to Ms. Downs is that she possessed

16

an unlawfully -- an unlawful controlled substance.

17

That is something that is going to have to be shown by

18

the State or they're going to fail in the first element that they

19

must prove.

20

element that they must prove is not prejudicial to Ms. Downs.

21

That's information that the jury and the fact finders are going

22

to have to receive anyway.

23

The fact that it was somewhere besides the second

I am, however, going to make it be specific so that if

24

there -- the cross examination may also allow that this was --

25

whether or not the search warrant was specifically to Ms. Downs.

-20That type of cross examination is appropriate as well.

It

doesn't look like there's any objection to this being why she was
taken to the jail.

They're not getting in the subject matter of

the bench warrants for the justice courts.

That doesn't seem to

be necessary, and I don't get -- sense from either argument that
6

there is any anticipation of the underlying warrants -- the

7

nature of the underlying.warrants being admitted for any 4 04(b)

8 I purposes.
the jail.
10
11

It's simply that Ms. Downs was arrested and taken to
Is that what evidence the State is anticipating as far

as any prior war -- bench warrants or convictions?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Yes, your Honor.

We weren't going to

12

delve into the nature of the warrants.

13

indicate that because that's the way that they normally do these

14

kinds of search warrants, execute these search warrants.

15

put people in restraints.

16

found warrants outstanding for Ms. Downs, and she was taken into

17

custody, arrested for that.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. TAN:

We were merely going to

They

They then check on warrants and they

And -And your Honor, I believe just so that there

20

are no unexpected surprises when actually we have the jury before

21

us, I think that I may very well on cross examination dive into

22

that issue, because I think if in fact the Court will allow the

23

search -warrant and some of the facts that transpired, at the

24

residence to come in to testimony, I think it will be important

25

for the jury to know that even though she was picked up on

-21warrants, these warrants were not drug related.

They were not --

they were from Davis and South Salt Lake Justice Court.
THE COURT:
MR. TAN:

Okay.
These are minor traffic warrants.

THE COURT:

If the defense is bringing that in then

6

it's not -- then it's not something that the Court needs to rule

1

on.

3

so there won't be any restriction that way.

9

on allowing in evidence for the State in its case of ch -- case

It's only if the State were anticipating bringing that in,
Clearly any ruling

10

in chief, the fairness issues go both ways, and full cross

11

examination within the rules is appropriate on that.

12

All right.

13

MR. BLAYLOCK:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. BLAYLOCK:

16

Anything else that we need?

Okay.
As indicated, the State intends to have

(inaudible) admitted into evidence.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. BLAYLOCK:

19

THE COURT:

20

Just one clarification.

Mr. Tan, so

Okay.
Does the Court ruling allow for that?

And have you seen the search warrant,

—

21

MR. TAN:

I (inaudible).

22

THE COURT:

-- you can give any response to that?

23

has the address.

24

ruling, that that gives context to the arrest.

9

It

It has the name, other information, is with my
Is there any

5 I objection to the search warrant itself actually being admitted?

-221

MR. TAN:

And your Honor, yes, we would be objecting to

2

that being able to come in.

3

to the testimony as far as background information for the jury to

4

K.now why the officers showed up at the residence to begin with,

5

but to (inaudible) jury have a copy of that bench warrant, 1

6

really don't see the purpose of that.

7

whether or not that the warrant v/as valid or if the officers had

8

a right to be there.

9

knowingly and intentionally had in her possession the controlled

10

THE COURT:

12

MR. TAW:

13

THE COURT:

15

They're not here to decide

They're here to decide if Ms. Downs

substance at the jail.

11

14

I cam see the testimony -- relevant

And

—

So I don't think it's going to -What is the State's desired purpose in

actually admitting the document itself?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Well, your Honor, in a way it's kind of a

16

response to the comments from defense Counsel, and that was v/as

17

this search warrant directed at the defendant, and that would

18

show no, it wasn't.

19

who else would be allowed to be searched at that time.

20

indicates that all persons who were in the house at the time

21

(inaudible).

22

THE COURT:

It was directed at Brian J. Stephens, and

Okay.

It

I am going to now alio* the document

23

itself to be admitted.

I think that that does become confusing

24

to the jury because the focus then becomes on the document.

2 5 I Certainly those questions are appropriate, but for the jury to

-23actually be perusing the document itself when that is not at
issue here and has not had legal rulings as far as I know on
the language in the search warrant, the -- I'm allowing that
information to get to the jury just to give it context of why

6

it was there.

That can be done through oral testimony and

questioning.

So the objection to the search warrant itself

7 I being admitted, at least at this point, seems to be well taken.
MR. BLAYLOCK:
9

Your Honor, would it be possible to admit

the search warrant and not the affidavit?

10

THE COURT:

Do you want to look at that?

I think the

11

same reasons -- the same objections.

12

that I think runs the risk of giving more ere -- I don't know

13

that it's credibility, just that a jury may give it more weight

14

simply because it is a document itself and because that is not

15

v/hat it at issue in the knowing and intentional possession here

16

in this case today.

17

objections that the documents themselves be admitted.

No.

18

MR. BLAYLOCK:

19

THE COURT:

20

need to discuss?

It's the documentation

At this time I'm sustaining the

Thank you.

All right.

Is there anything further that

All right.

21

MR. BLAYLOCK:

22 I

THE COURT:

Your Honor, there is one other issue.

Okay.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

This Court was adjourned for two weeks so

2 4 I that we could interview witnesses that Counsel -THE COURT:

Okay.

